Minimizing insider misuse through secure Identity Management by Fuchs, Ludwig & Pernul, Günther
SPECIAL ISSUE PAPER
Minimizing insider misuse through secure Identity
Management
Ludwig Fuchs∗12∗ and Gu¨nther Pernul2
1 Nexis GmbH, Pru¨feninger Str. 94a, D-93049 Regensburg, Germany
2 Department of Information Systems, University of Regensburg, Universita¨tsstraße 31, D-93053 Regensburg, Germany
ABSTRACT
To avoid insider computer misuse, identity, and authorization data referring to the legitimate users of systems must be
properly organized, constantly and systematically analyzed, and evaluated. In order to support this, structured and secure
Identity Management is required. A comprehensive methodology supporting Identity Management within organizations
has been developed, including gathering of identity data spread among different applications, systematic cleansing of
user account data in order to detect semantic as well as syntactic errors, grouping of privileges and access rights, and
semiautomatic engineering of user roles. The focus of this paper is on the cleansing of identity and account data leading
to feedback where insider misuse due to existing privileges which go beyond the scope of the users’ current need-to-know
may occur. The paper in detail presents used data cleansing mechanisms and underlines their applicability in two real-world
case studies. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
KEYWORDS
insider misuse; Identity Management; user account data; quality of identity data; role-based access control
*Correspondence
Ludwig Fuchs, Nexis GmbH, Pru¨feninger Str. 94a, D-93049 Regensburg, Germany.
E-mail: ludwig.fuchs@nexis-secure.de
1. INTRODUCTION
Insider threats represent the historical cause of the majority
of incidents with the authorized, non-technical employee
being the typical potential threat to Information Security
[1]. Several publications like [2] investigate the motivation
and impact of those attacks in detail. Widely cited surveys
like theBERR† Information SecurityBreaches Survey 2008
[3], or the CSI‡ Computer Crime and Security Survey 2008
[4], furthermore, underline that insiders like employees are
one of the biggest threats to data security.
Insiders misusing a system commonly act by using their
own user accounts and perform within the range of their
assigned privileges and access rights but abuse their current
job functions,which becamepossible because of inadequate
and manual user management [5]. In such an environ-
mentmisusemight remain undetected and invisible because
current detection methods mainly rely on rule-breaking
† Department for Business, Enterprise & Regulatory Reform, formerly
Department of Trade and Industry.
‡ Computer Security Institute.
behavior which would not be the case here. In 2006, Cap-
pelli et al. [6] investigated this problem and point out
possible ways of solving it.
During their lifetime in the organization employees are
not statically assigned to a certain job but migrate between
different job functions. Each change often goes along with
new and additional access privileges to the IT resources.
An additional risk arises from the fact that identity and
authorization data is usually spread among several appli-
cations (identity silos) and in the case an employee leaves
the organization is not completely revoked. The situation
described above is sometimes referred to as the so called
‘identity chaos.’ It describes a situation in which users
have multiple identities, passwords, and accounts spread
across a variety of security domains (networks, applica-
tions, computers, and/or computing devices). Given these
factors, it is not surprising that the Aberdeen Group§ states
that only 17 per cent of companies claim they do not have
orphaned accounts (accounts with access that should have
§ Aberdeen Group, Identity and Access Management Critical to Oper-
ations and Security, March 2007; Copyright © 2007, Aberdeen Group.
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been revoked). Some organizations take more than 30 days
to de-provision accounts and others have no defined pro-
cesses for de-provisioning or means to discover orphaned
accounts at all.
Related to preventing insider misuse is the aspect of eval-
uating the compliance of IT with laws and regulations.
Under this umbrella, organizations are increasingly forced
to control, manage, and audit their Identity Management
processes. Among the most known drivers are the U.S.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 [7,8], Basel II [9], the
German BSI Grundschutz [10], the Directive 95/46/EC of
the European Parliament [11], ISO IT Security standards
(such as ISO 27002), and own regulations large organiza-
tions use for their internal audits.
This paper is concernedwith the risk of systemmisuse by
over-authorized insiders to whom the capability of access-
ing one or many components of the IT system has been
legitimately given. It is an extension of the work published
in Ref. [12]. In order to fight the identity chaos and the
risk of insider misuse we propose a methodology for struc-
tured Identity Management consisting of (a) gathering of
identity data spread among different security domains, (b)
systematic cleansing of identity and account data in order
to increase their quality and detect orphaned accounts, (c)
grouping of privileges and access rights based on job func-
tions and organizational structure, and (d) semiautomatic
engineering of user roles. We give a general overview of
the methodology but have a focus on the data cleansing and
detection of the orphaned accounts phases.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 contains the
general overview, Sections 3 and 4 have a focus on syntactic
and semantic data cleansing and Sections 5 and 6 contain
the evaluation of ourmethodology by performing case stud-
ies with account data of companies. Section 7 contains the
conclusion and future work.
2. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE
CONTROLE METHODOLOGY
ContROLE is a methodology and corresponding tool set
supporting a structured Identity Management process. The
process consists of six different phases (Figure 1). Early
stages are concerned with gathering identity and account
information as well as information about the organiza-
tional structure of the enterprise. They are followed by
data cleansing, aiming at detecting inconsistencies, syn-
tactic and semantic errors, and orphaned accounts. Final
phases are concernedwithmining andgrouping access char-
acteristics, relating them to typical job functions, and with
suggesting user roles. Themethodologymay be applied as a
whole (leading to a role catalog) or only partly, for example,
data cleansing process steps only. The six phases and the
respective quality measurement (QM) and execution deci-
sion (ED) steps during phase transition allow users of the
methodology to move back to previous phases or within
phases in an incremental and iterative fashion.
Figure 1. Structured Identity Management process according to
the contROLE methodology.
Applying the methodology has high potential for reduc-
ing the risk of insider misuse. The earlier phases help to get
a better understanding where identity and account data is
spread in the organization and in what aspect security poli-
cies in different domains differ. Making security officers
and CIOs aware of this is an important part of mitigat-
ing the risk of insider misuse. Analyzing and cleansing of
existing identity and account data is central to reducing the
risk. It significantly contributes to increasing the quality
of identity and account information by pointing to syntac-
tic and semantic errors in directories, orphaned accounts, or
existing privileges whichmight not be necessary to perform
the job. Also structuring the user population according to
typical user roles has significant benefit to hinder insider
misuse.
The following is a short description of each of the cont-
ROLE process steps. Data gathering is concerned with the
compilation of a consistent information repository repre-
senting the basis for further data cleansing, data preparation,
and role development. Identity and account information
can be spread over several security domains and hidden in
LDAP directories, meta-directories, authorization lists, and
tables or embedded within different applications. Molloy et
al. [13] recently provided a compilation of different dimen-
sions of available input data based on existing electronically
stored identity informationwithin the organizations’ IT sys-
tems. Aminimal configuration of input data consists of user
permission information, in other words, the set of users,
the set of permissions, and the binary user-permission-
assignments (UPA). Commonly, extensional user attribute
data is available. That is, a user’s job title, hierarchy ele-
ments, or locations are given. Additionally, organizational
structure of an enterprise is related to the access controls
as it is commonly stored within databases. Often, also per-
mission parameter information is provided, for example, a
number of permissions that may concern the same target
system. In some systems, additionally permission update
information that records how the access control state has
evolved in the past is available. Permission usage informa-
tion, at last, could be available in the form of logs showing
which permissions are used at what time.
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After input data has been cleansed (Sections 3 and 4), the
processmoves on toData Preparation andSelection. Its goal
is to automatically generate additional knowledge about the
cleansed input data by using classification and clustering
technologies. In order to arrive at a suitable role catalogue,
it is mandatory to allow choosing the users, rights, and/or
organizational units to be included in the role development
process. Phases 4--6 are devoted to the actual Role Develop-
ment. The outcome is a set of roles of a certain type: Basic
roles bundle common access privileges within organiza-
tional elements, organizational roles represent job positions
while functional roles represent common task bundles of
employees. The roles are stepwise derived, coming from
more general ones, such as basic roles to very specific
ones. The methodology supports iterative role development
through integration of role mining and role engineering
in various loops. While mining is concerned with analyz-
ing patterns in user account information, role engineering
follows a top--down approach and considers input data con-
cerning the organizational structure of the enterprise.
More information about the contROLEmethodology can
be collected at www.nexis-secure.com. Different aspects
are already published, i.e., the general process of in-
house IdentityManagement [14], tool support for structured
Identity Management [15], the process of semi-automated
generation of roles [16] the impact of the data cleansing
phase on data quality, and insider threat [12]. This work
extents the work in Ref. [12] focusing on the different
aspects and new mechanisms for semantic cleansing of
identity and account data in order to reduce insider misuse
(Sections 3 and 4).
3. SYNTACTIC CLEANSING OF
IDENTITY AND ACCOUNT DATA
There is a common agreement that identity data as stored
in the access controls (e.g., access control lists) tends to
be incomplete, noisy, and inconsistent [17]. Analyzing and
cleansing of this data is, therefore, central to reducing the
risk of insider misuse. After the initial data gathering, the
contROLE methodology, therefore, continues with syntac-
tic and semantic data cleansing. From the previous phase
it assumes the existence of a central information repository
built from existing identity and account data as well as data
concerning the organizational structure of the enterprise.
After errors have been detected and cleansed, the updated
data is written back to the originating sources.
Syntactic checks aim at revealing errors regarding the
input data entities while semantic checks try to identify
inconsistencies in the relationships among those entities.
Additionally, the methodology provides a Policy Check-
ing Engine (PCE) which allows organizations to validate if
existing security policies are correctly applied. All activities
mentioned are supported by a computerized tool. This sec-
tion describes syntactic data cleansing and the PCE before
Section 4 focuses on the semantic data analysis.
3.1. Syntactic analysis of identity and
account data
Syntactic analysis follows the process described in Figure
2 (gray shading represents optional tasks). It aims to detect
invalid data like misspelled attribute values, duplicate or
similar datasets, incomplete datasets with missing- or null-
values, and violations of referential integrity constraints.
In the case valid value lists have been provided a con-
sistency check can optionally be carried out to ensure the
correctness of the datasets corresponding to the employ-
ees, permissions, and hierarchical structure. Actual values
which are not included in the valid value lists are high-
lighted. The consistency check includes a distance metric
similar to the Levenshtein distance [18] in order to propose
a valid value for an erroneous entry. As an example con-
sider a misspelled name of an employee. Instead of deleting
the respective dataset the correct employee name should be
proposed. In the case no correct value can be proposed, the
consistency check by default assigns a null-value, mark-
ing datasets for further investigation. The same holds for
predefined null-values included in valid value lists.
A duplicate check identifies identical datasets while the
similarity check reveals misspellings. The latter is com-
monly applied in case the consistency check has been
skipped. Again, distance metrics are computed and used
for the detection of errors and the proposal of correct values
for misspelled datasets. Finally, a check for missing values
reveals incomplete datasets. Depending on the general pol-
icy, these datasets could be deleted. More likely, however,
the missing values are replaced with a valid null-value. This
allows for the later treatment during the semantic cleansing.
3.2. Policy Checking Engine
Besides the semi-automated syntactic and semantic data
investigation the contROLE methodology allows for the
Figure 2. ContROLE process steps for syntactic analysis.
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consideration of available security -- or IdM policies during
a policy checking activity. Since the upcoming of govern-
mental regulatory requirements an increasing demand for
accountability urges organizations to improve compliance
practices. IdM is regarded as an essential part for achieving
compliance in the area of user management [19].
However, up to now there has been hardly an integration
of IdM practices with the aforementioned controlling
practices required by the governance frameworks and
certification processes. One goal of the contROLE method-
ology, therefore, is the automatic integration as well as
re-engineering (in other words, the critical investigation
and optimization) of security policies concerning Identity
Management.
During a first step users of the methodology can define
security policies within a dedicated tool or import existing
policies (Figure 3). After the import or definition activity
contROLE checks the enforcement of the policies on the
basis of the existing and precleansed identity data. Policy
checking can be executed iteratively and periodically for
all organizational units or only for preselected parts of the
company. In order to support a revision process the cont-
ROLE toolset generates a reporting overview of all detected
policy violations for technical users of the methodology. It
suggests sending the identified policy violations that cannot
be resolved by technical experts for reviewing by business
professionals. Using their feedback of those technical and
managerial experts, the policy violations on the one hand
can be resolved and, on the other hand, the policies them-
selves can be investigated and re-engineered if necessary.
The methodology allows for the checking of different
security policy types. One major security policy type is
Separation of Duty (SoD) constraints limiting the relation-
ships of users to permissions [20,21]. SoD constraints can
be defined for permissions and predefined roles. Hence,
Table I. Separation of Duty constraints.
SoD rule Constraint
SoD001 Mutual Exclusion {FR:Cost Accounting,
FR:Business Management}
SoD002 Min Assigned Employees {FR:Project
Controlling}=2
contROLE allows users of the methodology to specify bun-
dles of permissions or business roles which must not be
assigned to a certain number of employees or one single
employee at a time. Note that up to now this checking is
restricted to static SoD constraints and not dealing with
dynamic SoD.
As an example, a departmentalmanagermight define two
constraints (Table I). Firstly, the two roles Cost Account-
ing and Business Management must not be carried out by
one single person (rule SoD001). Besides the SoD con-
straints, contROLE is able to include cardinality constraints
on identity related data during the policy checking process.
The departmental manager in the example above might,
secondly, require that Project Controlling is carried out by
at least two employees (rule SoD002 in Table I), in other
words, no single employee alone must be responsible for
executing the related task bundles.
Our main research focus concerning the PCE up to now
was on the manual definition of security policies within the
contROLE toolset. Providing standardized data exchange
interfaces is currently under development. We are imple-
menting XML-, OLE/COM-, or text-based interfaces for
the inclusion of existing security policies (Figure 4).
We are furthermore extending the PCE to additionally
be able to include digitally available business processes
or UML diagrams annotated with security requirements
or actors carrying out task bundles. Usable approaches
Figure 3. ContROLE process steps for policy checking.
Figure 4. Automatic inclusion of operational structures and policies.
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Figure 5. ContROLE process steps for semantic analysis.
that focus on the automatic extraction of roles or security-
relevant information from organizational structures have
been proposed in Ref. [22] and recently in the context of
Identity Management also in Ref. [23].
4. SEMANTIC CLEANSING OF
IDENTITY AND ACCOUNT DATA
In addition to the syntactic checks, the contROLE method-
ology provides functionality for semantic analysis of the
input data, which, in specific, is important for the detection
of potential insider threat risks. Technologies used by the
contROLE toolset to identify semantic errors are statisti-
cal analysis, clustering, classification, mining, and artificial
neural networks. While syntactic checks might be fully
automatable, semantic checks cannot be processed without
human intervention. Therefore, results need to be visualized
appropriately and be sent to a domain expert for approval.
Focusing on the relationship between permissions,
employees, and organizational hierarchy elements (OHE),
semantic error detection is used to detect different types of
outliers. An outlier in general is understood as an object
exhibiting alternative behavior in a dataset, i.e., a data point
that does not conform to the general patterns characteriz-
ing the dataset [17]. The contROLE methodology is able to
detect the following outliers: (a) employees with authoriza-
tions not matching their job functions (e.g., over-authorized
employees), employees with atypically assigned permis-
sions or attributes, employees with valid but incorrectly
assigned attribute values and (b) permissions no longer in
use but still assigned to employees and permissions used
by nearly all employees within an organizational unit. We
call type (a) ‘employee outliers’ and type (b) ‘permission
outliers’.
Semantic analysis follows the processmodel described in
Figure 5. While the permission outlier checks reveal poten-
tially erroneous user-permission assignments for deletion,
neural networks, and employee classification techniques
highlight attribute values or permissions of employees
which might be subject to re-assignment.
4.1. Detect neural networks outliers
The first type of semantic checks detects outliers in the form
of identity and account data of employees with atypically
assigned permissions or attributes using self-organizing
maps (SOMs) as proposed by Kohonen [24]. Identity and
account information from a specific element of the organi-
zational hierarchy or even the whole input dataset can be
selected for investigation. Before the detection of seman-
tic anomalies can be conducted, the underlying SOMs
have to be parameterized and trained. During training, the
SOM groups employees according to the similarity of their
assignedpermissions. Similar users are located close to each
other whereby employees with different access rights are
located on different parts of the map.
The example shown in Figure 6 illustrates the detection
of outliers by using SOMs. It depicts part of a SOM used
Figure 6. Employee outlier detection using SOMs.
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to classify identity and account information of employ-
ees based on the attribute ‘assignment to OHE’, i.e.,
every employee is classified according to his aggregated
hierarchy level (HL) assignment. Consider the employees
Trent Klein and Max Strasser. Assume both employees
have been re-assigned to the Support department (blue
colored). Max Strasser’s old access privileges from the
Infrastructure department (green colored) have been cor-
rectly de-provisioned. However, his departmental attribute
has not been changed. He therefore is visualized as outlier
within a group of Support department employees. On the
contrary, Trent Klein’s old access privileges have not been
revoked and his OHE assignment has not been updated yet.
Trent thus is located in between the green andblue employee
groups. Additionally, every null-value is considered to be
an outlier (see yellow colored pie charts in Figure 6).
After detection, a decision about the treatment of the
candidate errors needs to be made. For proposing a cor-
rect attribute value, the methodology analyzes all identity
and account data located on a suspicious node and its direct
neighborhood (NL-1) and selects the element with the high-
est similarity to the identified outlier. The non-aggregated
class information of this user is proposed as correct value.
In the example above Max Strasser has been identified as
a member of the Support department (HL-1). If this OHE
has five sub-departments, Max Strasser could potentially be
assigned to either of them. Thus, in the example the employ-
ees assigned to the same node and the employees located on
the three surrounding nodes are analyzed for their similar-
ity to Max Strasser. In case the winner unit is assigned to a
Support Billing department (HL-2), this value is proposed
as correct value for Max Strasser.
Even though the contROLE methodology supports a
manual review of the trained SOMs, it incorporates an
algorithm (SOMParsing) which we developed to automat-
ically investigate neighborhood levels of each node (NL,
Figure 7. Neighborhood levels on a SOM.
see Figure 7) for their predominant class information by
analyzing the set of employees allocated to the NL. Imag-
ine a situation where 10 employees constitute the NL-1 of a
given node. If nine of those employees are assigned to class
A, while one of them is assigned to class B, A is considered
the predominant class of NL-1 with 90 per cent weighting.
Table II describes four checks providing a heuristic to
extract suspicious node elements from a given SOM. Even
though the algorithm does not claim to extract all poten-
tial outliers, contROLE suggests an iterative application
in order to detect a high percentage of the outliers on the
map. Example visualizations for each check are given in
Figure 8.
The different checks are used during the detection of erro-
neous datasets. Check 1 investigates ambiguous nodes with
more than one class information value assigned on which
the predominant class A represents more than x per cent
of all node members. Members not assigned to this class
(yellow coloring in the left SOM in Figure 8) are marked
as outliers if the node is surrounded by nodes exclusively
Table II. SOMParsing checking criteria.
Check NL-0 NL-1 NL-2
1 A (>x per cent; <100 per cent) A Not considered
2 A (>x per cent; <100 per cent) A (>y per cent) Not considered
3 B A (>x per cent) A (>y per cent)
Figure 8. SOMParsing Checks 1-3 (from left to right).
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Table III. Contingency table of employees and permissions.
Permissions
GlobalID P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7
CS1910 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
LL1012 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
JA1210 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
MR0120 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
LS1050 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
RS1201 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
DH2323 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
representing the class information A (blue coloring) on
NL-1.
Check 2 is essentially a less restrictive version of Check
1. It weakens the detection policy and thus might likewise
lead to an increased false-positive rate. In contrast to Check
1,Check 2 does not require allNL-1 nodes being assigned to
the same predominant class A. Check 3 considers homoge-
nous nodes with a predominant class B assigned on NL-0
(yellow coloring in the right SOM in Figure 8) that are sur-
rounded by nodes with the predominant class A on NL-1
andNL-2. In this case, again, thresholds for the predominant
classes need to be defined.
Note that the respective threshold for the application of
the checks has to be manually set. In order to support this
process, contROLE suggests the visual analysis of trained
maps prior to the automated investigation. The subjective
map quality can hint at the suitability of a more restrictive
or loose parsing parameter.
4.2. Detect classification outliers
During a second process step of the semantic data anal-
ysis, employees are automatically grouped according to
their similarity on the basis of a heuristic classification
mechanism. The goal is to identify groups of similar
employees that are not fully homogenous. These groups
can be used for detecting employees with superfluous per-
missions assigned. The classification process is divided
into three steps. Firstly, the similarity matrices of the
investigated employees are calculated on the basis of the
given UPAs. Secondly, the heuristic classification is exe-
cuted for defining employee classes and all employees are
assigned to exactly one of the predefined classes accord-
ing to their maximum similarity. Thirdly, the result quality,
i.e., the heterogeneity of the defined classes, is calculated.
The process is presented in more detail in the following
subsections.
4.2.1. Derive similarity matrices.
After the scope of the employee classification (e.g., the
investigated department) has been defined, the similarity
matrices are derived based on a similarity coefficient (the
Jaccard coefficient [25] is used in the following). A simpli-
fied example is given in Table III.
In this example seven employees are either assigned (1) or
not assigned (0) to seven different permissions (P1--P7). For
the calculation common permissions (P1, P2) are excluded
as they do not affect the classification process. Assume that
permission P3 is an outdated permission no longer in use
by Linda Loner (LL1012).
She and Chris Summer (CS1910), for example, share
three permissions (P4, P5, and P6) while P7 is assigned
to none of them and P3 is only assigned to Linda Loner.
The similarity value is calculated pair-wise according to
the Jaccard coefficient for all employees resulting in the
symmetric similarity matrix depicted in Table IV.
4.2.2. Heuristic classification.
After the calculation of the similarity matrices, the actual
classification is carried out by using a heuristic classification
algorithm. The procedure can be divided into two steps: At
first class centers are defined on the basis of a given upper
bound and secondly the employees are assigned to these
classes in a disjunctive and exhaustive manner.
In more detail, a starting point for the classification an
employeewith themost similarity values above a predefined
threshold is selected as reference user of the first employee
class. Successively the representative of a second class C2
is chosen on the basis of the minimal similarity to the rep-
resentative of the previously defined class. For the selection
of the representative of the remaining classes the lowest
maximal similarity to the existing classes is facilitated. As
a stop criterion the previously used threshold is considered,
arguing that in case every remaining object is similar to
an already existing class, it is not feasible to define further
classes.
Table IV. Similarity matrix of employees.
GlobalID CS1910 LL1012 JA1210 MR0120 LS1050 RS1201 DH2323
CS1910 1 0.75 0 0 0.4 0.5 0.50
LL1012 1 0.2 0.2 0.6 0.4 0.4
JA1210 1 1 0.5 0.25 0.25
MR0120 1 0.5 0.25 0.25
LS1050 1 0.75 0.75
RS1201 1 1
DH2323 1
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Table V. Lowest maximal similarity selection.
GlobalID RS1201 JA1210 Max s(i ,j )
CS1910 0.5 0 0.5
LL1012 0.4 0.2 0.4
MR0120 0.25 1 1
LS1050 0.75 0.5 0.75
DH2323 1 0.25 1
Continuing the example introduced above, the employees
RS1201, LS1050, as well as DH2323 have three similarity
values equal or above a predefined threshold of 0.7 (Table
IV). The algorithm suggests choosing one of those employ-
ees as representative of the first employee class C1 (e.g.,
RS1201). The employees JA1210 and MR0120 have the
lowest similarity value (0.25) in respect to RS1201. Again,
one of them (e.g., JA1210) is randomly selected as repre-
sentative of the second employee class.
LL1012 has the lowest maximal similarity to the exist-
ing class representatives (0.4 in Table V). This object is thus
selected as representative for a third class. All other employ-
ees are too similar to the existing class representatives, so no
further classes are created. Finally, unclassified employees
are assigned to the defined classes according to themaximal
similarity, leading to the following class definition
C1 = {RS1201,LS1050,DH2323}
C2 = {JA1210,MR0120},C3 = {LL1012,CS1910}.
Note, that after the definition of those three classes,
the creation of a fourth class is not feasible: CS1910 and
LS1050 are the objects with the lowest maximum similarity
to the existing class representatives; however, their values
are already 0.75, in other words, above the threshold of 0.7.
4.2.3. Calculate result quality.
Asa last step of the employee classification algorithm, the
overall quality of the results is calculated. In the context of
data quality analysis the classification results are considered
the better the more homogenous classes are in terms of the
included objects. The contROLE methodology facilitates
the average distance of employees within a certain class Ci
for gathering a classification quality value. Classes with a
high-homogeneity value which is below 1 hint at two types
of outliers. Firstly, a small number of class members might
be assigned to permissions which have not been correctly
de-provisioned. Secondly, some class members might be
missing permissions that are typical for the respective class,
leading to an increase of the heterogeneity value.
The class heterogeneity can be calculated according to
Heterogeneity(Ci) = 2|Ci| × (|Ci−1|) ×
∑
i,j∈Ci
d(i, j)
with d(i,j) being the distance between two class members
i and j. In respect to class C3 the heterogeneity is 0.25.
Linda Loner andChris Summer (LL1012, CS1910) are both
grouped into one class but Linda’s excessive permission
P3, which she no longer needs for her work, decreases the
result quality of the class definition. In real-life examples
employees have a larger number of permissions, resulting
in a more fine-grained result quality differentiation. Thus,
appropriate thresholds for highlighting permission outliers
can be defined and the employee classification can be used
for detecting them.
4.3. Detect permission outliers
The last process step during semantic data analysis deals
with outliers concerning the distribution of single permis-
sions among the hierarchy elements of the organization,
carried out by a (a) rare permission check and the inverse
(b) common permission check. Both checks are split into a
detection and refinement phase. After the initial detection
of possible outliers a crosschecking reduces the amount of
outliers that are communicated to domain experts without
actually being an error (false-positive rate). As an exam-
ple, Figure 9 visualizes the candidate permission outliers
detected by both checks for a hierarchy unit with 500 users.
A rare permission is defined as an access privilege that
is only assigned up to a certain percentage of employees
within the organization (lower bound parameter). In the
example three permissions are marked as rare permissions
(12, 3, and 89). These permissions could be local or individ-
ual permissions needed for specialist tasks. However, they
Figure 9. Rare permission and common permission detection.
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Figure 10. Permission outlier refinement.
could likewise be no longer in use but have not been de-
provisioned correctly or be orphaned accounts referring to
employees who may not work in the company any more.
Therefore a refinement step investigates every orga-
nizational unit with at least one employee assigned to
a suspicious permission. The percentage of employees
assigned to the respective permission in these hierarchy ele-
ments needs to be below a predefined threshold in order to
mark the dataset as outlier.
Figure 10 illustrates the refinement of the candidate
outlier permissions 3 and 12 from the example above.
Permission 3 is assigned to 10 employees (2 per cent of
500 employees). It is exclusively used in the Development
department (10 employees). Thus permission 3 is likely no
outlier but related to specialist tasks. In contrast, the lower
part of the picture shows the crosschecking of permission
12 which is assigned to three employees spread across the
whole organization. This permission thus might be consid-
ered as an outlier that needs to be further investigated by a
domain expert. The common permission check is reverse to
the rare permission check. It investigates permissions that
are assigned to a very high percentage of the employees
(permissions 22, 6, and 9 in Figure 9). The goal is to iden-
tify missing user-permission assignments. Themost critical
stage in applying both aforementioned checks is the param-
eterization of the bounds for detecting potential errors as
well as the refinement threshold. One indicator could be
the average number of employees per investigated organi-
zational unit in case of a low standard deviation. The same
holds for the refinement threshold which could be defined
depending on the average employee count in the different
departments.
In order to cleanse the semantic errors and the potentially
unresolved syntactic errors, the results have to be sent for
review to a human domain expert. The errors are bundled
according to elements of the organizational hierarchy and
users togetherwith the proposed correct values. The domain
expert can then accept this proposal or alter the data. By
exposing the correct input data elements to the productive
systems in place, the quality of the identity and account data
has been advanced and the risks for security breaches and
systemmisuse by insiders has been considerablyminimized
in a timely manner.
In general, applying syntactic and semantic cleansing
of identity and account data has high potential for reduc-
ing the risk of insider misuse. It significantly contributes
to increasing the quality of identity and account informa-
tion by pointing to errors in directories, outdated privileges,
orphaned accounts, or existing privileges which might not
be necessary to perform the job. Analyzing and cleansing
account information is also a prerequisite for structuring
the user population according to typical user roles. Hav-
ing proper knowledge of potential roles is rudimental for
role-based access controls [17], which also has significant
benefit to hinder insider misuse.
5. CASE STUDY SEMICOND
After the data cleansingmechanisms applied during the exe-
cution of the contROLEmethodology have been presented,
the paper continues with their evaluation in a real-world
application scenario, using a complex and potentially erro-
neous dataset provided by a large cooperation operating in
many countries all over the world.
5.1. Data gathering
The input data used (from hereinafter called Access
Controls following the terminology of Molloy et al.
[13]) originate from the Identity Management repository
(Microsoft Active Directory) of a large industrial organiza-
tion. The company, from hereinafter called SemiC, operates
worldwide with about 30 000 employees. For this appli-
cation scenario the Active Directory domain Asia-Pacific
including 8115 employees and their memberships in 7533
different groups is provided. In the following, every group
is treated as permission. The SemiC access controls include
the employees, their assigned department, location and the
group memberships (see extract in Table VI).
Table VII sums up the relevant statistics for the provided
Access Controls. During the initial data import duplicate
datasets already have been excluded reducing the UPA
(user-permission assignments) from 151062 to 150329.
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Table VI. Access Controls extract SemiC.
Accountname;Location;Department;Permission
roN1w;Malacca;SCMY IT;CN=AP-SemiCEmployees-G
roN1w;Malacca;SCMY IT;CN=MKZ-OU-Users-G
roECn;unspec;SCWU IT MFG;CN=AP-SemiCEmployees-G
roECn;unspec;SCWU IT MFG;CN=WUX-ITCoordinator-G
row6r;Singapore;SCAP IT;CN=SeC-Employees-SG-U
[. . . ]
Table VII. Access Controls statistics SemiC.
Access Controls
element Total
Employees 8115
Permissions 7533
Hierarchy elements 1527 (1486 line-, 41 geographic hierarchy)
UPA 151062 (after import 150329)
5.2. Syntactic data cleansing
Executing the similarity checks introduced earlier is not
reasonable as the employee names were randomized and
the organizational unit names are abbreviations. Only for
the location attribute can suggestions according to the Lev-
enshtein distance [18] be made. Additionally, all missing
location and department values of users have been set to the
valid null-value UNSPECIFIED for further investigation
(missing value check).
In our scenario a list of valid organizational units for
the line -- and the geographic hierarchy has been provided.
Checking the consistency of the line organization marked
263 out of 1486 hierarchy elements as invalid. One reason
for this high number might be the large amount of organi-
zational restructuring within SemiC which took place over
the last years. Old organizational units might not have been
de-provisioned correctly and thus still exist in the directory
environment.
Besides the line organization, the consistency of the geo-
graphic structure of SemiC has been analyzed (Figure 11).
Several datasets with a location value from other regions
than Asia are identified together with cryptically named
locations. The related datasets (12 employees, 238 UPA)
might represent accounts of employees that have been re-
assigned to a new site while their location attribute has
not been updated. Thus, the null-value UNSPECIFIED is
assigned to affected employees and the related UPA are
further investigated during the semantic data analysis. Sec-
ondly, several datasets with a misspelled location attribute
have been revealed (e.g., Xi’an instead ofXian; Levenshtein
distance 1.0).
Syntactic data checking revealed that a total of 263 out
of 1486 organizational units in the line organization and
15 out of 41 OHE in the geographical hierarchy have
been identified as erroneous. Carrying out the referential
integrity check revealed 32 employees with two or more
assigned hierarchy elements of the same OHE type. This
small number of violations might be the result of previ-
Figure 11. ContROLE consistency check results.
ous consolidation efforts of the Identity Management team
within SemiC. In total the previous syntactic data cleansing
efforts reduced the number of UPA included in the Access
Controls from 150329 to 146584 and the total number of
employees from 8115 to 7576. In terms of insider threat
the results show a large number of active user accounts
with invalid attribute assignments. The related access rights
represent major security holes for insider attacks.
5.3. Semantic data cleansing
In the following, the different aspects of semantic data
cleansing are described in more detail, beginning with the
identification of employee outliers, and continuing with
the detection of permission outliers using the previously
presented techniques.
5.3.1. Identify employee outliers.
Employee outlier detection is carried out for the pre-
cleansed dataset on the basis of a semi-automatic SOM
analysis. Figure 12 presents the SOM visualization of the
geographic hierarchy of SemiC‖. It can be seen that employ-
eesworking in the same locations are in general located near
to each other (same coloring). However, areas where users
from different locations are located close to each other are
also visible (centre part of Figure 12). These areas either
hint at permission bundles (and thus roles) that are valid
throughout several locations or could represent erroneous
data elements.
For deciding about which of the employees are consid-
ered as potential outliers for attribute value re-assignment,
our tool allows for different threshold levels during the
‖ Note that the lattice numbers are only partly visible as they are over-
laid by the pie charts. The depicted map, however, visualizes all 7576
remaining employees in the input data.
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Figure 12. SOM analysis of the SemiC geographical hierarchy.
analysis steps. In the given example, error detection and
data cleansing is carried out within seven iterations, using
the manual map investigation, and industry partner feed-
back as abort criteria. During the first iteration nodes with
more than 75 per cent, but less than 100 per cent of the
node members being assigned to the predominant node--
class are marked as outliers. The refinement step validates
whether their first neighborhood level is also dominated by
the same class by more than 75 per cent. If this condition is
true the node is cleansed. During the consecutive iterations
these threshold values are adapted based on themanual map
investigation in order to identify remaining outliers. The last
iteration involves a manual selection of suspicious datasets
not identified previously.
Focusing on the upper left part of Figure 12, Figure 13
shows the effects of the aforementioned cleansing process
using the SOMParsing algorithm iteratively. On the left side
several outlierswith the location attribute Singapore (green)
are depicted in the group of users working in Kulim. The
contROLE toolset thus extracts these datasets and proposes
Kulim (blue) as correct location attribute value. Remem-
ber that such employees with wrongly assigned location
attributes negatively influence the consecutive role develop-
ment process. Additionally, note that the cleansing process
described requires human interaction in order to finally
decide if a suspicious dataset is erroneous or not. The
contROLE toolset allows for the integration of business
know-how for acquiring high-quality results.
5.3.2. Identify permission outliers.
Subsequent to the employee outlier detection the com-
mon permission analysis reveals potentially missing UPA.
Executing it with the exemplary upper bound of 0.95 (line
organization) resulted in 175 UPA of this type. Addition-
ally, the rare permission check is executed for the level-1
Figure 13. Employee outlier cleansing with contROLE (erroneous vs. cleansed data).
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Figure 14. Rare permission check refinement results.
line organization departments in order to reveal permissions
which are likely to be no longer needed but existing due to
incorrect de-provisioning processes.
At first, the respective threshold needs to be thoroughly
set. If 5 per cent or less of the employees within a level-1
department, e.g., are assigned to a certain permission, the
check considers 43630 of the remaining 146759 UPA (29.7
per cent) suspicious.However, in order tominimize the false
positive rate the restrictive bound of 0.01 has been used
in the following, highlighting 20288 potentially erroneous
UPA (13.8 per cent of the total UPA).
Consecutively, the refinement loop excludes UPA
assigned tomore than a certain percentage of the employees
within a non-aggregated department. Figure 14 depicts the
percentage of the 20288 suspicious UPA considered erro-
neous after the refinement loop (blue coloring) in relation
to the excluded UPA (gray coloring) depending on the used
refinement threshold. It can be seen that a high-refinement
parameter leads to all 20288 suspicious datasets being con-
sidered erroneous while a low parameter excludes a high
percentage of them from further investigation. During our
evaluation process a restrictive refinement parameter of 0.1
was applied in the following in order to minimize the false-
positive rate (5852 candidate errors).
5.4. Data cleansing impact
This section briefly sums up the impact of the data cleansing
efforts for reducing insider misuse, retrospectively under-
lining the importance of this contROLE phase (Table VIII.).
Overall, an average reduction of the input data elements
within the SemiC Access Controls of about 12.75 per cent
has been achieved carrying out the described checks. The
result refinement in shows that the number of permissions
even could be reduced by 18.31 per cent. This underlines
the large number of potentially outdated but still accessi-
ble permissions within the provided input data. The results
moreover underline that the high reduction of permissions
Table IX. Access Controls statistics RetComp.
Access Controls element Total
Employees 2393
Permissions 881
Hierarchy elements 431 (337 line organization)
UPA 76665
only has little impact on the existing UPA as most excluded
permissions are individual permissions.
Note that these statistics to not depict the numer-
ous re-assignments of attribute values carried out during
the semantic data cleansing. Additionally, executing the
employee classification checks would have led to even
higher error detection and data cleansing rates. However,
the investigation of employee classes was out of scope of
the case study and thus not executed.
6. CASE STUDY RETCOMP
In order to show the applicability of our methodology and
toolset we carried out a second case study dealing with a
medium-sized organization in the retail sector.
6.1. Data gathering
The input data used in the second case study originate
from the IdM repository (Microsoft ActiveDirectory) of the
medium-sized company, from hereinafter called RetComp.
The company operates in large parts of Europe with more
than 2000 employees. The company-wide Active Directory
includes nearly 900 different permissions (AD groups, see
Table IX).
Every group is treated as permission in the remainder.
In the following the one central department of RetComp
(Purchasing: 279 employees, 252 permissions, 11221UPA)
Table VIII. Data cleansing impacts on the SemiC data.
Access Controls element Raw input After cleansing Reduction (per cent)
Employees 8115 7576 6.64
Permissions 7533 6154 18.31
Hierarchy elements 1527 1232 19.32
UPA 151062 140907 6.72
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Figure 15. Employee outliers in the purchasing department.
is investigated in detail, focusing on the semantic anomalies.
The syntactic data analysis results are not shown in detail
at this point, as the goal of the analysis was the discovery
of employees with untypical access rights and employees
with excessive permissions which are no longer needed and
represent a threat for security.
6.2. Semantic data cleansing
In the following the employee outlier detection using SOMs
as well as the clustering of employee groups and the statis-
tical analysis of permission assignments have been carried
out in order to extract semantic data anomalies.
6.2.1. Identify employee outliers.
At first, a neural network analysis was carried out for
the department. Note that for readability reasons not the
whole neural network but just the essential parts for this
interpretation are shown.
The map in Figure 15 shows the members of the depart-
ment grouped in the left upper corner in gray color. The
remainder of the map depicts employees in other depart-
ments of RetComp (uncolored). One can see that most of
the employees within Purchasing represent a homogenous
group with similar access rights typical for that part of the
company. However, the analysis extracted several outliers
representing employees that are members of Purchasing
but have untypical access rights. Overall, a total of 8 per
cent of the employees in Purchasing (22 out of 279) were
marked as outliers. A detailed analysis integrating expert
knowledge from Identity Management representatives of
RetComp revealed that most of the marked outliers are
identities used by trainees. Those trainees typically were
reassigned to different departments over time and accumu-
lated excessive permissions,making thema potential source
for insider threats.
6.2.2. Cluster analysis.
In addition to the neural network investigation, a cluster
analysis was executed to detect employees with untyp-
ical permissions. It on the one hand underlined the
homogeneous permission structures within the department
Purchasing and, therefore, pointed out its suitability for later
role development. Nevertheless, several anomalies were
identified.
The following example (Figure 16), e.g., reveals a sub-
department with 12 employees from which 11 with 36
permissions in average have been grouped in an employee
class with a class similarity of more than 90 per cent. The
Figure 16. Cluster analysis of a sub-department of purchasing.
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Figure 17. Permission distribution in the purchasing
department.
second employee class has only one member (the depart-
mental head) which has different access rights assigned.
Several employees of the large class, however, had addi-
tional permissions assigned and one employee was missing
a permission that the other 10 employees were assigned to.
Even though the employees were still grouped, the class
heterogeneity is not null, leading to the necessity of further
investigation.
Overall, the results of the cluster analysis have underlined
its applicability to detect erroneous identity data, employee
accounts, and permissions. Again, one core aspect of the
cleansing process is the manual re-investigation of domain
experts after the detection of potential outliers. Due to the
semantic background knowledge needed a fully automated
data cleansing process is not feasible.
6.2.3. Identify permission outliers.
Besides the neural network analysis and the employee
classification, an investigation of the access rights structures
was carried out to detect common and rare permissions.
In the Purchasing department 51 of the 252 different per-
missions (20 per cent) are assigned to only one employee.
Refining the results with the permission spreading algo-
rithm reduced the error rate to 13 per cent. Nevertheless,
this high number of permissions is currently re-investigated
for appropriate provisioning. With this re-investigation,
the Identity Management representatives of RetComp aim
at reducing administrative overhead by reducing the total
number of permissions used by employees aswell as license
costs for permission usage (e.g., Operating System licenses,
database and development software licenses, etc.).
Figure 17 visualizes the permission distribution, showing
the large number of different permissions (x-axis) which are
assigned to a very small number of employees (y-axis) on
the left side. On the right side the permissions assigned to
nearly every employee are depicted. The analysis revealed
26 of 252 permissions as common permissions that can be
bundled within a departmental role. The detailed analysis
in Figure 18 shows that several access rights are assigned
to more than 99 per cent of the employees in Purchas-
ing. The representatives of RetComp, therefore, needed to
re-investigate the missing assignments and correct those
potential errors. One example ofmissing assignmentsmight
be Microsoft Office licenses (276 out of 279 employees) or
Microsoft Windows XP Service Pack licenses (277 out of
279 employees).
6.3. Data cleansing impact
This section briefly sums up the impact of the semantic
data cleansing efforts for reducing insider misuse, retro-
spectively underlining the importance of this contROLE
phase within the purchasing department of the RetComp.
Firstly, 26 common permissions (out of 252 permissions in
Figure 18. Common permissions in the purchasing department.
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total) have been bundled in one departmental role, reducing
the UPA from 11221 to 4948 (−55 per cent). This depart-
mental role is now used for automatically (de-)provisioning
a large amount of the required access rights. Secondly, the
neural network analysis and the cluster analysis led to the
cleansing of numerous wrongly assigned permissions. Note
that employees that have been considered outliers in the
neural network analysis could also have been detected as
suspicious during the cluster analysis.
7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE
WORK
Effectively administrating employees’ access to sensitive
applications and data in order to reduce the risk of insider
misuse is one of the biggest security challenges for today’s
organizations. A typical large organization manages mil-
lions of user access privileges that are spread across
thousands of IT resources. This paper has shown that not
carefully maintained user accounts of individuals that have
a trusted relationship with organizations -- namely (former)
employees, contractors, or consultants -- represent a typical
potential threat for Information Security. Those authorized
non-technical insiders directly interact with an organiza-
tion’s Information Systems, have some type of authority on
those systems, and know about security processes and how
to circumvent them. Because detectionmethodsmainly rely
on rule-breaking behavior, a misuse performed by those
types of users is very difficult to detect. Making security
officers and CIOs aware of these threats is an important
part of mitigating the risk of insider misuse.
During their lifetime in the organization, employees usu-
ally develop a personal career andmigrate between different
jobs and assignments. Each change implies new duties and
responsibilities which in general come along with new and
additional obligations and access privileges. As a conse-
quence, many users possess more access privileges than
necessary to perform their actual job, permissions exist
which are not used anymore, or accounts are still valid for
which users that already have left the organization.
This paper dealt with the risk of system misuse due to
bad quality of the identity and account data. In order to
encounter the related risk of insider misuse, we proposed
the methodology contROLE for structured Identity Man-
agement including syntactic and systematic cleansing of
account data. It was shown that cleansing of identity and
account data results in a considerable increase of data qual-
ity. User accounts and permissions which did not reflect the
current job function of the employees, orphaned accounts,
inconsistencies, errors, and permissions no longer needed
could be detected and resolved.We gave a general overview
of the methodology, background information on the cleans-
ing algorithms we are using and a report about the results
gathered from two real-life application cases.
For future work we are currently developing and evalu-
ating additional semantic data cleansing checks which aim
at identifying employees and departments with untypical
and excessive permissions assigned in specific depart-
ments. This for instance includes detection mechanisms
for employees with excessive permissions in single depart-
ments. Additionally, we are extending the contROLE PCE
with standardized data exchange interfaces. Our goal is fur-
thermore to enable the contROLE methodology to be able
to include digitally available business processes or UML
diagrams annotated with security requirements during the
checking of security policies concerning digital identities
and account data.
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